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THE DOCTRINE OF AFTER-ACQUIRED TITLE
INTRODUCTION

This Comment will discuss briefly some of the problems which can
arise when one person attempts by a valid instrument to convey more
title than he actually has and subsequently acquires the title which
he had purported to convey. Historically, in such a case the grantor
is estopped to assert his after-acquired title against his grantee.' It
has been said that this result is achieved through estoppel by deed
rather than by estoppel in pais;' and that, therefore, there is no necessity for an adjudication of the rights of the parties in such a case;$
and that there is no necessity for showing a change in position of the
party asserting the estoppel.4
Tiffany states that there is no necessity of regarding the afteracquired title as actually passing to the grantee.' However, there
are numerous decisions and dicta in this country to the effect that
the conveyance actually passes the grantor's after-acquired legal title
to the grantee.! There have been,' and still are,' a number of statutory
provisions to this effect in various states. It should be remembered
that a void deed (void in the sense of improper execution, lack of
delivery, or insufficient description of the land) will not pass after'Sturgeon v. Wingfield, 15 Mees & W. 224, 153 Eng. Rep. 831 (Ex. 1846); Doe d.
Christmas v. Oliver, 10 Barn. & C. 181, 109 Eng. Rep. 418 (K.B. 1829); 4 TIFFANY,
REAL PROPERTY § 1230 (3d ed. 1939); III AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 15.19 (1952);
5 THOMPSON, REAL PROPERTY § 2602 (perm. ed. 1941).
24 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 1230 (3d ed. 1939).
'III AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 15.18 (1952).
4 Rutherford v. McGee, 241 S.W. 629 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922); III AMERICAN LAW OF
15.18 (1952).
54 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 1230 (3d ed. 1939).

PROPERTY §

aBiwer v. Martin, 294 Ill. 488, 128 N.E. 518 (1920); and see RAWLE, COVENANTS FOR
248 (5th ed. 1887), and the numerous cases therein collected, including, e.g.,
Ackerman v. Smiley, 37 Tex. 211 (1873), and Watkins v. Wassell, 15 Ark. 73 (1854).
7 RAWLE, COVENANTS FOR TITLE § 249 (5th ed. 1887), and the early statutes therein
collected and discussed.
8
Arkantas, ARK. STAT. § 50-404 (1947);
TITLE 9

California, CAL. CIv. CODE 5 1106 (Deering 1941);
Colorado, CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 118-1-15 (1953);
Idaho, IDAHO CODE ANN. § 55-605 (1947);
Illinois, ILL. REV. STAT. C. 30, S 6 (1955);
Iowa, IOWA CODE § 557.4 (1954);
Kansas, KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 67-207 (1949);
Missouri, Mo. REV. STAT. § 442.430 (1949);
Montana, MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 67-1609 (1947);
Nebraska, NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-209 (1943);
Nevada, NEV. COMp. LAWS 5 1505 (1929);
North Dakota, N. D. REV. CODE § 47-1015 (1943);
Oklahoma, OKLA. STAT. tit. 16, § 17 (1951);
Utah, UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-1-10 (1933); and
Virginia, VA. CODE ANN. tit. 55, § 52 (1950).
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acquired title.' The instrument must be valid except for the fact
that the grantor does not have as much title as he purports to convey.
LEGAL OR EQUITABLE?

There seems to be some question as to whether the passage of afteracquired title is achieved through legal or equitable doctrines. The
doctrine of estoppel by deed is equitable in its origin." However, on
the basis of decisions or dicta it must be considered to be the rule
in most states that a conveyance which will create an estoppel to assert
an after-acquired title will transfer not only the beneficial interest
but also the legal title to the grantee or his successors." Where there
are statutes on the subject,"2 they are expressly to that effect." It is
said that the title vests by operation of law, or by inurement (the
grantor's after-acquired title inures to the benefit of the grantee)
as soon as it is acquired by the grantor 4 without the need of judicial
assistance." This rule of property would appear to be legal in operation, rather than equitable. For purposes of this discussion the term
inurement will be used to describe the passage of legal title, and the
term estoppel by deed will be used to describe the equitable doctrine.
The question as to whether after-acquired title inures to the benefit
of the grantee by virtue of legal or equitable principles may appear
to be of theoretical interest only in those jurisdictions which have a
blended system of law and equity; however, this is not so. It has
importance in regard to whether judicial proceedings are necessary
to pass the legal title, and it has importance in regard to whether
the grantee has a right of electing to reject the after-acquired title
in order to sue for breach of warranty. The problem will be discussed
in more detail, infra.
9Kemery v. Zeigler, 176 Ind. 660, 96 N.E. 950 (1912), and the many authorities cited
therein. See also, BIGELOW, ESTOPPEL 338-341 (4th ed. 1886).
"oSee III AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY S 15.23

(1952).

"Id. at S 15.21. And see, e.g., Biwer v. Martin, 294 I1. 488, 128 N.E. 518, 522 (1920).

2See note 8 supra. See also Annot., 58 A.L.R. 367 (1929).
13Ibid.
"Scott v. Cohen, 115 F.2d 704 (5th Cir. 1940); Weegens v. Karels, 374 Ill. 273, 29
N.E.2d 248 (1940); Crider v. Kentenia-Catron Corp., 214 Ky. 353, 283 S.W. 117 (1926);
St. Landry Oil and Gas Co. v. Neal, 166 La. 799, 118 So. 24 (1928); Sorrell v. Bradshaw, 222 S.W. 1024, 1025 (Mo. 1920); Armour Realty Co. v. Carboy, 124 N.J.L. 205,
11 A.2d 243 (1940); Caswell v. Llano Oil Co., 120 Tex. 139, 36 S.W.2d 208 (1931);
Baldwin v. Root. 90 Tex. 546, 40 S.W. 3 (1897); III AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY
5 15.21 (1952).

"5Ibid.

16 See III

AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 15.23 (1952). And see the dictum in Wheeler
v. Young, 76 Conn. 44, 55 Atl. 670, 672 (1903): "It may be said that such estoppel by
deed is not an equitable doctrine, but it is a rule of the common law, based on the recitals

or covenants of the deed."
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The equitable doctrine of estoppel by deed and the legal doctrine
of inurement can both be operative in the same jurisdiction. In Oklahoma, for example, one can find statements by the court that the
doctrine is equitable in nature," as well as statutes18 and cases"' stating the rule of property that after-acquired legal title passes to the
grantee by operation of law. The Oklahoma statue applies to pass
legal title only when the grantor purported to convey a fee. The
equitable doctrine is used when interests less than a fee have been
purportedly conveyed. It would seem that when legal principles are
operative by statute the equitable doctrine is not excluded; it can be
relied on in situations which are not covered by the statute.
NECESSITY OF COVENANTS

In spite of statements of a contrary view,"0 it seems that covenants
of warranty are not necessary for the passage of after-acquired title
by estoppel by deed or by inurement." The majority view seems to
be that if the conveyance purports to transfer some certain estate,
the grantor is estopped, irrespective of the presence of covenants, to
assert that an estate did not pass by virtue of his deed." It has also
been stated that where a covenant of warranty is expressed in, or
implied by, the deed, the grantee has a right to the title under the
covenant, and the principle of estoppel need not be invoked to give
him that right." This would, it seems, also be true under statutory
covenants of warranty 4 and under statutes which provide that a
grantor's after-acquired title will pass automatically to the grantee
where the deed purports to convey a certain interest or title."
POSSIBILTY OF ELECTION

Where A, having no title, purports to convey to B by general
warranty deed, B can sue A for damages for the breach of warranty.
But where A later acquires title, will such a suit for damages bar B
17 Hanlon v. McLain, 206 Okla. 227, 242 P.2d 732
8

1

9

(1952).

OKLA. STAT. tit. 16, § 17 (1951).

See Born v. Bentley, 207 Okla. 21, 246 P.2d 738 (1952).
See 4 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY S 1232 (3d ed. 1939); Annot., 58 A.L.R. 380 (1929).
"Van Rensselaer v. Kearney, 18 U.S. (11 How.) 631 (1850); Lindsay v. Freeman, 83
Tex. 259, 18 S.W. 727 (1892); 4 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 1232 (3d ed. 1939); II
20

AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 15.19 (1952).
22 See note 21 supra.

"'Robinson v. Douthit, 64 Tex. 101, 106

(1885); Harrison v. Boring, 44 Tex. 255,

261 (1875); and Gould v. West, 32 Tex. 339, 353 (1869).
ME.g., ARz. CODE ANN. § 71-408 (1939); FLA. STAT. § 689.03 (1953); IDAHO CODE
ANN. § 55-612 (1947); Miss. CODE ANN. § 847 (1942);
(1949); TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN., art. 1297 (1945).
2 See notes 7 and 8 supra.

Mo. REV. STAT. § 442.420
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from claiming A's after-acquired title? Or will the doctrine operate,
vesting B with A's newly acquired title? If so, can A reduce the
damages which he would be required to pay, or recover any damages
which he had already paid for the breach of his warranty?
One view is that the after-acquired title passes to the grantee in
spite of its prevention" or reduction"7 of recovery (possibly to the
extent of making him liable for the repayment of recovered damages) for breach of the covenants of title. In the early case of Sayre
v. Sheffield Land, Iron & Coal Co.,28 the Supreme Court of Alabama
in an action on breach of warranty, where defendant had no title
when the deed was made but acquired title before suit was brought,
held that plaintiff is entitled to only nominal damages, as the title
acquired by defendant inures to plaintiff's benefit. It should be
mentioned that these cases concern the fact situation where the
defendant in the warranty suit acquires title before judgment. Few
cases have been discovered where the grantor had paid a judgment
for breach of warranty and then acquired title to the property in
question.2" They indicate that the grantee would be estopped to claim
the grantor's after-acquired title after receiving damages for breach
of the covenants. However, it is submitted that in situations of
this nature the title examiner for the purchaser from the grantor
who had paid the judgment and later acquired the title which he
seeks to convey would be well advised to require a deed from the
grantee who had recovered damages for the breach of warranty,
if the title examiner learns of the prior deed and judgment. A deed
would be necessary because the legal rule of inurement would automatically vest legal title to the property in the grantee, even though
he had collected damages for the breach of warranty. Therefore, if
that grantee would not convey his interest, the purchaser could
probably not take good title from the grantor. In representing the
grantor who is required to pay damages for breach of covenants
28 Powers

v. Patten, 71 Me. 583

(1880);

Baxter v. Bradbury, 20 Me. 260

(1841);

Reese v. Smith, 12 Mo. 344 (1849); Knowles v. Kennedy, 82 Pa. 445 (1877); Farmer's
Bank v. Glenn, 68 N.C. 35 (1873). And see III AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 15.23
(1952); 7 THOMPSoN, REAL PROPERTY § 3845 (perm. ed. 1941).

Compare the case of King v. Gleason's Adm'x, 32 Ill. 348 (1863), which says that the
after-acquired title will inure to the benefit of the grantee even after suit for breach of
covenants is commenced, if such title is acquired before damages are assessed against the
grantor.
" Cornell v. Jackson, 3 Cush. 506 (Mass. 1849), where the defendant in a Suit on the
warranties acquired a portion of the warranted premises, that portion inured to the benefit
of the plaintiff and reduced his damages pro tanto.
2s 106 Ala. 440, 18 So. 101 (1895). Accord: Reese v. Smith, 12 Mo. 344 (1849).
29Lost Creek Coal & Mineral Land Co. v. Hendon, 215 Ala. 212, 110 So. 308 (1926);
Alger-Sullivan Lbr. Co. v. Union Trust Co., 207 Ala. 138, 92 So. 254 (1922); and Campbell v. Martin, 89 Vt. 214, 95 At. 494 (1915).
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the attorney should consider the advisability of insisting that the
same judgment which decrees damages would also cancel the deed
and vest the grantee's claim to title in the grantor. In cases of
partial failure of title, the grantee's claim to title could be revested
in the grantor to the extent for which grantor is required to respond
in damages.
On the other hand, it has been said that since both the legal rule
of inurement and the equitable doctrine of estoppel by deed were
developed for the benefit of the grantee, in those cases where the
grantee has already asserted a claim for breach of covenant and
the grantor then acquires the title called for by his deed, the grantee
has an option either to accept the after-acquired title or to stand
on his claim for damages."° Under this view it would seem that the
grantee would be held to his election if he chose to take the judgment
for damages on the covenant and was paid; consequently, the afteracquired title would not operate to his benefit in such a situation."
It is submitted that the grantee would have an election under the
equitable doctrine of estoppel by deed to accept the after-acquired
title or to reject it and sue for breach of the covenants of title.
Payment to the grantee would constitute such an election, and
title acquired by the grantor after payment would not benefit the
grantee. It is further submitted that under the legal rule of inurement the grantee would have no election and that the after-acquired
title would vest in him by operation of law, even if the grantor
had already paid a judgment for damages on the breach of warranty.
This legal rule of property makes for security of title and prevents
the creation of troublesome questions which would be raised for
the title examiner by the use of any election on the part of the
grantee. For example, most abstracts would not show whether the
grantee had made a claim for breach of the covenants, even if a
suit on the covenants had been actually filed, nor would they show
what election the grantee made. Therefore, it is suggested that the
preferable rule would be to allow no election, to apply the rule of
property that the after-acquired title automatically passes to the
grantee by operation of law and to give the grantor an equitable
lien on the property and a right to recover damages paid before the
doctrine operated. If the grantor acquired the title before judgment,
'°Burton v. Reeds, 20 Ind. 87, 93 (1863); Blanchard v. Ellis, I Gray 195, 199 (Mass.
1854); Remser v. Carney, 52 Minn. 397, 54 N.W. 89 (1893); Tucker v. Clarke, 2 Sandf.
Ch. 96 (N.Y. 1844); Woods v. North, 6 Humph. 309, 313 (Tenn. 1845); McInnis v.
Lyman, 62 Wis. 191, 22 N.W. 405, 406 (1885); III AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 15.23
(1952); 4 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY S 1230 (3d ed. 1939).
" Cases cited note 29 supra.
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the operation of the legal doctrine would reduce or prevent the
recovery of damages for the breach of warranty.
QUITCLAIMS

It is often said that the grantor in a quitclaim deed is not estopped
to assert an after-acquired title. 2 This, it seems, is not necessarily
true in all cases. If the grantor sets forth on the face of the instrument, by recital or averment, that he owns or is possessed of a particular estate in the premises, the grantor and his privies with notice
would be estopped to assert that the grantor acquired title after
the time of his purported conveyance."
It should be remembered that the basic difference between a deed
and a quitclaim is that a deed purports to convey title to land, but
a quitclaim purports to transfer only the grantor's interest, not
necessarily the land itself. 4 However, under the "four corners"
rule of construction, i.e., that an instrument will be construed by
weighing each of its provisions in the light of all the other provisions contained therein, it cannot be dogmatically stated that the
simple test which has just been stated conclusively brands an instrument as either a quitclaim on one hand or as a deed on the other."
Therefore, one should consider this possibility in applying the rule
of thumb that quitclaims will not work an estoppel as to afteracquired title.
The doctrine of estoppel by warranty can be effective to make
the grantor's after-acquired title jump to the grantee, even in a
quitclaim deed. However, for this result to be achieved the warranty
must extend to the estate which the grantor purportedly owned,
not to the estate which was conveyed. An interesting example of
the result where a grantor conveyed all her "right, title, and interest"
(quitclaim) with covenants of warranty to defend "the title to the
said property conveyed herein" is the case of Clark v. Gauntt.5 In
32E. g., Brown v. Harvey Coal Corp., 49 F.2d 434, 439 (E.D. Ky. 1931); Quivey v.
Baker, 37 Cal. 465, 471 (1869); Haskett v. Maxey, 134 Ind. 182, 33 N.E. 358, 360
(1893); French v. Bartel & Miller, 164 Iowa 677, 146 N.W. 754, 755 (1914); and Perrin
v. Perrin, 62 Tex. 477, 479 (1884). See also, 4 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY S 1231 (3d ed.
1939).
33See Van Rensselaer v. Kearney, 18 U.S. (11 How.) 631 (1850), and the authorities
cited therein. See also the discussion and collection of cases at III AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY S 15.19 (1952).

" See Clark v. Grauntt, 138 Tex. 558, 161 S.W.2d 270 (1942); Roswurm v. Sinclair
Prairie Oil Co., 181 S.W.2d 736 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944) error ref. w.o.m.; Cook v. Smith,
107 Tex. 119, 174 S.W. 1094 (1915); Annot., 3 A.L.R. 945 (1919).
"SSee Trico Oil Co. v. Pelton, 114 S.W.2d 1209 (Tex. Civ App. 1938). Compare Compton v. Trico Oil Co., 120 S.W.2d 534 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938) error ref. See also note 28

sxpra.
a6

13 8

Tex. 558, 161 S.W.2d 270 (1942).
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that case the Texas Supreme Court adopted the Commission's opinion
which stated:
The rule as to after-acquired title does apply to mortgages as well as
deeds. (citation of authorities) But it does not apply to the deed of
trust executed by ...(grantor), because by it she did not convey the
lots or the entire interest in them but she granted and conveyed only
the interest she then owned and she warranted the title only to the
property that she conveyed ....
The deed of trust ...purports to convey the interest that...
(grantor) owned at the time it was executed and not any greater
interest or estate. As to the warranty, the general rule is that the
covenant of general warranty extends only to what is granted or purported to be granted. (citation of authorities)"

It would seem that if grantor had warranted title to the fee instead
of to the "said property conveyed herein" she would have been
estopped to assert her after-acquired title. Therefore, in executing
quitclaim deeds one should be careful to make no recitals or averments that the grantor owns a certain interest in the land, and if
covenants of warranty are used, they should extend only to the
interest, if any, which is granted, and not to any certain interest
in the land.
CASES WHERE DOCTRINE INAPPLICABLE

Since the doctrine applies only when the assertion of the afteracquired title would involve a denial that the conveyance passed
the interest or estate which it purported to pass or convey, it does
not apply where the grantor re-acquires the title from the grantee
either by voluntary conveyance," judicial sale or sale at execution,"a
adverse possession," or tax sale. ' Nor, in certain cases, is the grantor
estopped to assert that, while the legal title was by the conveyance
vested in the grantee, the beneficial interest was vested in another."'
An interesting exception to the rule that the doctrine of afteracquired title does not apply where the grantor re-acquires the title
from the grantee by sale at execution is the Texas case of Cherry
138 Tex. at 561, 161 S.W.2d at 271.
"8Condit v. Bigalow, 64 N.J. Eq. 504, 54 Ati. 160 (1903).
"9Erwin v. Morris, 26 Kan. 664 (1881); Rauch v. Dech, 116 Pa. St. 157, 9 Ati. 180
(1887); Goode v. Bryant, 118 Va. 314, 87 S.E. 588 (1915).
40E.g., Abbett v. Page, 92 Ala. 571, 9 So. 332 (1891); Harne v. Smith, 79 Tex. 310,
15 S.W. 240, 242 (1891).
"'Erwin v. Morris, 26 Kan. 664 (1881); Foster v. Johnson, 89 Tex. 640, 36 S.W. 67
(1896).
"' Harrold v. Morgan, 66 Ga. 398 (1881); Condit v. Bigalow, 64 N.J. Eq. 504, 54 Atl.
160 (1903).
37
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v. Farmers Royalty Holding Co." In that case A conveyed fee title
to B, reserving a vendor's lien. A assigned his lien to C. B executed
deeds to a one-half mineral interest to D who conveyed the one-half
mineral interest to Farmers Royalty. C foreclosed by judicial process
and acquired full fee title. C conveyed the fee to B (who had made
the mortgage and executed the mineral deed in question). B conveyed to Cherry. In holding that Cherry had constructive notice
of Farmers Royalty's claim and that Farmers Royalty had good
title to a one-half mineral interest, the Supreme Court of Texas
per Chief Justice Hickman said:
... where a party claiming title through his predecessor under a
warranty deed, fails because of the invalidity of a deed to his predecessor, the subsequent acquirement of title by the latter inures to the
party's benefit by virtue of the warranty and may be the basis of a
new action by him. (Emphasis added) 44

The court distinguished Breen v. Moorehead, discussed infra, and
held under the chain of title doctrine that Cherry had constructive
notice of Farmers Royalty's claim and was therefore not a bona fide
purchaser for value.
It should also be noted that the result of this case was achieved
under estoppel by warranty, and that the same result would not
necessarily follow under estoppel by deed.
PURCHASE MONEY MORTGAGE

Assume in a hypothetical fact situation that G buys land from E,
executing a purchase money mortgage on the land. G subsequently
acquires better title to that same land from some other source. E
forecloses his purchase money mortgage after G's failure to pay the
mortgage. Query: Does the mortgage bind the after-acquired title?
There is a paucity of authority on this point, and it is split. The
better view seems to be that the covenants in the purchase money
mortgage operate only upon the estate acquired from the mortgageevendor and do not operate upon an after-acquired title from another
source. 45
COTENANCY

Where cotenants convey to each other in order to effect a voluntary partition, the conveyances should be construed only as covering
43 1 3 8 Tex. 576, 160 S.W.2d 908 (1942).
"138 Tex. at 580, 160 S.W.2d at 910.
" Randall v. Lower, 98 Ind. 255 (1884); and 4
(1939). Cf. Hitchcock v. Fortier, 65 Ill. 239 (1872).

TIFFANY,

REAL PROPERTY

S 1233
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such interest as they all have (since they claim from a common
source), and if one of them subsequently acquires a paramount
title, he is not estopped to assert it against the others."' The reason
for this exception to the doctrine of the passage of after-acquired
title to the grantee seems to be that the purpose and effect of the
cotenants' cross conveyances was not to transfer title to the land
but merely to achieve a voluntary partition of such interests as
the cotenants owned at the time of conveyance and to designate the
share of each of the parties."'
PERSONS BOUND BY DOCTRINE

Heirs of the grantor are precluded, to the same extent as was the
grantor, from asserting that any estate acquired by the grantor after
his conveyance but before his death did not inure to the benefit of
the grantee. ' However, it should be noted that the heirs of the
grantor are not estopped to assert a title subsequently acquired by
them from some source other than through their ancestor, the
grantor."'
It has been frequently said that an estoppel by deed binds not
only parties but also privies." There are a number of early cases
which have strictly applied this rule by holding that a subsequent
grantee is estopped to assert his grantor's after-acquired title against
the grantor's prior grantee, without regard to whether the subsequent
grantee had notice of the prior conveyance. 1 The better view seems
to be that the subsequent grantee for value is not bound by the
doctrine unless he had either actual or constructive notice of the
prior conveyance."
A literal application of the general principle that the estoppel
48Doane v. Willicutt, 5 Gray 328 (Mass. 1855); Pendill v. Marquette County Agriculture Soc., 95 Mich. 491, 55 N.W. 384 (1893); Rector v. Waugh, 17 Mo. 1 (1852); and
Carson v. Carson, 122 N.C. 645, 30 S.E. 4 (1898).
" Chace v. Gregg, 88 Tex. 552, 32 S.W. 520 (1895).
"8E.g., French v. Spencer, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 228 (1858); DuBose v. Kell, 90 S.C. 196,
71 S.E. 371 (1911).
"8 E.g., Ebey v. Adams, 135 Ill. 80, 25 N.E. 1013 (1890); Win. D. Cleveland & Sons
v. Smith, 113 S.W. 547 (Tex. Civ. App. 1908), rev'd on other grounds, 119 S.W. 843
(1909). And see 4 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 1233 (3d ed. 1939).
50 BIGELOW, ESTOPPEL 629 ( 6th ed. 1886); and 4 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY S 1234 (3d

ed. 1939).
"' E.g., Powers v. Patten, 71 Me. 583 (1880); Ayer v. Philadelphia & Boston Face Brick
Co., 159 Mass. 84, 34 N.E. 177 (1893); Knight v. Thayer, 125 Mass. 25 (1878); White
v. Patten, 24 Pick. 324 (Mass. 1837).
5 E.g., Wheeler v. Young, 76 Conn. 44, 55 Atl. 670 (1903); Donahue v. Vosper, 189
Mich. 78, 155 N.W. 407 (1915); Ford v. Unity Church Soc., 120 Mo. 498, 25 S.W. 394
(1894); Richardson v. Atlantic Coast Lumber Co., 93 S.C. 254, 75 S.E. 371 (1912);
Bernardy v. Colonial & United States Mtg. Co., 17 S.D. 637, 98 N.W. 166 (1904); and
Breen v. Moorehead, 104 Tex. 254, 136 S.W. 1047 (1911).
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binds all who are in privity with the grantor would include bona
fide purchasers for value who claim through the grantor's afteracquired title. s3 A number of early cases adopted this view," and
other jurisdictions have reached the same result by virtue of the
wording of the recording act'" or because of the wording of statutory
rules to be followed in the case of after-acquired title."
On the other hand, many jurisdictions follow the view that
recordation made prior to the date that the grantor acquires title
is outside the chain of title and does not afford constructive notice
to a bona fide purchaser for value; therefore, the subsequent purchaser can get good title by virtue of the protection of the recording
act, cutting off the earlier grantee's claim to title by inurement or
by estoppel."
The Texas law is not clear on this point. Breen v. Moorehead"
seemed to recognize and adopt the latter rule by saying:
A purchaser is not charged with notice of a conveyance which is
of record, even though made by a person in the chain of title, unless
it was made by such person after the time at which the records show
him to have obtained the title; that is, the purchaser is not bound to
search the records to determine whether any particular person in the
chain of title, prior to obtaining the title, had done any acts which

would affect the title."

However, the Breen case was distinguished in the Cherry case" and
its authority was thereby considerably narrowed. For a discussion
of the chain of title problem in Texas in regard to whether or not
recordation gives constructive notice to a purchaser, see Olds, "The
Scope of the Texas Recording Act,"" and Williams, "Recordation
Hiatus and Cure by Limitation.""
54 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY S 1234 (3d ed. 1939); III AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY
15.22 (1952).
54 See note 51 supra.
"'Hitt v. Caney Fork Gulf Coal Co., 124 Tenn. 334, 139 S.W. 693 (1911).
S6Owen v. Brookport. 208 Ill. 35, 69 N.E. 952 (1904); Tilton v. Flormann, 22 S.D.
324, 117 N.W. 377 (1908). Also see note 8 supra.
'" Rozell v. Chicago Mill & Lumber Co., 76 Ark. 525, 89 S.W. 469 (1905); Wheeler v.
Young, 76 Conn. 44, 55 Ati. 670 (1903); Donahue v. Vosper, 189 Mich. 78, 155 N.W.
407 (1915), aff'd, 243 U.S. 59 (1917); Ford v. Unity Church Soc., 120 Mo. 498, 25
S.W. 394 (1894); Wack v. Collingswood Extension Realty Co., 114 N.J. Eq. 253, 168 Ati.
639 (1933); Builders Sash & Door Co. v. Joyner, 182 N.C. 518, 109 S.E. 259 (1921);
Bernardy v. Colonial & U.S. Mtg. Co., 17 S.D. 637, 98 N.W. 166 (1904); Breen v. Moorehead, 104 Tex. 254. 136 S.W. 1047 (1911). Also see I TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 476 (3d
ed. 1939), and 2 POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 658 (5th ed. 1941).
"a104 Tex. 254, 136 S.W. 1047 (1911).
5" 104 Tex. at 257, 136 S.W. at 1048.
60 138 Tex. 576, 160 S.W.2d 908 (1942).
6"8 Sw.L.J. 36 (1954).
"' 29 TExAs L. REv. 1 (1950).
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The subsequent grantee should not be estopped to assert title
acquired by him from another source. This is similar to the situation
where an heir of the grantor inherits the grantor's barred claim
to after-acquired title and also acquires a paramount title from
some other source."'
RIGHTS OF INTERVENING JUDGMENT CREDITORS

Fact situation number one: A has no title. A attempts to convey
to B. Judgment is rendered against A. A acquires title to the land
which he purported to convey to B. Query: Does the after-acquired
title pass to B free of, or subject to, the judgment lien? It has been
held that B gets the title free of the judgment lien."
Fact situation number two: A has no title. Judgment is rendered
against A. A attempts to convey to B. Then A acquires title to
the land in question. Query: Does the after-acquired title pass to B
free of, or subject to, the judgment lien? There is a split of authority.
Some cases have held that B's title is subject to the judgment lien;"3
others have held that it is free of the judgment lien."6 The better
view would seem to be that B's title is subject to the judgment lien,
for it does not seem that, by reason of the grantor's lack of title
at the time of his purported conveyance, the grantee should profit
at the expense of the judgment creditors. 7
DOCTRINE APPLIES TO LEASES

It is well settled that if a man makes a lease covering land in
which he has no interest and later acquires an interest in the land,
the lease will operate upon his interest as if it had been vested in
him at the time of the lease."'
DOCTRINE APPLIES TO CONTRACTS TO CONVEY

Where one contracts to convey land in which he has no interest
but in which he later acquires an interest, specific performance of
the contract may be enforced against him. 9 The legal doctrine of
inurement would not be applicable, for he did not purport to convey
an interest in the land."
63 See note 49 supra. Also see THOMPSON, REAL PROPERTY 5 2603 (1941).
4Lamprey v. Pike, 28 Fed. 30 (1886); Brown v. Barker, 35 Okla. 498,

130 Pac. 155

(1913); Watkins v. Wassell, 15 Ark. 73 (1854). Contra, Leslie v. Harrison National Bank,
97 Kan. 22, 154 Pac. 209 (1916).
EF. g., Bliss v. Brown, 78 Kan. 467, 96 Pac. 945 (1908).
66Watkins v. Wassell, 15 Ark. 73 (1854).
7

See 4 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 1234 (3d ed. 1939).
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TIFFANY, LANDLORD AND TENANT S 76 (1910); Co.LITT. 45a, 47b.
POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 1405b, p. 1047 (5th ed. 1941), and authorities

cited therein.
"' See notes I and 12 supra.
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Professor Kulp states the well settled rule that: "The doctrine
of after-acquired title gives the lessee of a lease or the grantee of a
mineral deed . . . the benefit of the after-acquired title of the lessor
or grantor."'"
A doctrine analogous to the after-acquired title doctrine has been
developed in the field of oil and gas. This doctrine was first applied
in the case of Duhig v. Peavy-Moore Lumber Co."' and takes its
name from that case. In that case the grantor Duhig owned the
surface and one-half of the minerals. He conveyed the land to X,
reserving one-half of the minerals. The Supreme Court of Texas
adopted the Commissioner's opinion which in holding that "land"
meant the "physical land" described and not the grantor's interest
in the land said:
... The result is that the grantor has breached his warranty, but
that he had and holds in virtue of the deed containing the warranties
the very interest, one-half of the minerals, required to remedy the
breach. Such state of facts at once suggests the rule as to afteracquired title ....
In the instant case Duhig did not acquire title to the one-half interest in the minerals after he executed the deed containing the general
warranty, but he retained or reserved it in that deed ....
If enforcement of the warranty is a fair and effectual remedy in case of afteracquired title, it is, we believe, equally fair and effectual and also appropriate here.7"
The opinion went on to hold that the covenant operates as an
estoppel denying to the grantor and those claiming under him the
right to set up his title against the grantee and those claiming under

him."4
SUMMARY

This discussion would indicate that:
1. The doctrine of after-acquired title was equitable in its origin.
2. The doctrine will not only estop the grantor but will transfer
his legal title to the grantee in most American states.
7111 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY

§ 10.15 (1952), citing Greenshields v. Superior Oil

Co., 204 Okla. 681, 233 P.2d 959 (1951); Smith v. Bateman, 230 S.W. 831 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1921).
'135
Tex. 503, 144 S.W.2d 878 (1940).
73135 Tex. at 507, 144 S.W.2d at 880.
"4The doctrine of Duhig v. Peavy-Moore Lumber Co. has been considerably limited in

the recent cases of Harris v. Windsor, -Tex.-,
(1956); and Gibson v. Turner, -Tex.-,
noted, 11 Sw. L. J. 249 (1957).

294 S.W.2d 798, 6 Oil and Gas Rep. 1234

294 S.W.2d 781, 6 Oil and Gas Rep. 1212 (1956)t
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3. There are a number of statutes creating a legal rule of inurement.
4. Covenants are not necessary for the passage of after-acquired
title by estoppel by deed or inurement, but when they are present
title under the covenants may be asserted independently of estoppel
by deed.
5. There is some question as to whether a grantee has the option to
accept the after-acquired title or reject it and sue for damages for
the breach of covenants.
6. Quitclaims will not ordinarily pass after-acquired title, but
in certain extreme instances they may do so.
7. The doctrine does not apply where the grantor re-acquires title
from the grantee or where the claim to after-acquired title is not
inconsistent with the original grant.
8. Purchase money mortgages probably bind only the interest
acquired from the vendor.
9. The doctrine does not apply to cross conveyances of cotenants
which are made to achieve a voluntary partition of such interests
as they own.
10. Heirs of the grantor are bound as to interests acquired through
the grantor but not as to interests acquired from some source other
than the grantor.
11. The doctrine binds parties with notice.
12. The recording acts may protect bona fide purchasers of value
without notice.
13. The doctrine applies to leases.
14. The doctrine applies to oil, gas, and mineral interests.
15. The doctrine of Duhig v. Peavy-Moore is analogous to afteracquired title doctrine and can be used to bind interests which are
owned at the time the grantor breaches his warranty.
Charles Robert Dickenson

